Secure and Lightweight Deduplicated Storage via Shielded Deduplication-Before-Encryption

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
Outsourced Storage

- > Data outsourcing is a plausible storage solution in data explosion
 - Global datasphere grows to 175 ZB by 2025
 - 49% of the world's stored data will reside in public clouds [*]

- > Two primary requirements
 - Storage efficiency: reduce storage overhead as much as possible
 - Data confidentiality: defend against data privacy leakage

Data Deduplication

- > A space-efficient storage approach
 - Unit: chunk (fixed-size or variable-size)
 - Compute a fingerprint for each chunk (e.g., SHA-256)
 - Manage fingerprint index to track stored chunks
 - Store only one copy of duplicate chunks
 - Achieve ~10x storage space savings in backup workloads [Wallace, FAST'12]




Deduplication-after-Encryption

- ➤ Deduplication-after-Encryption (**DaE**)
 - Augment deduplication with encryption for data confidentiality
 - Carefully encrypt chunks to preserve deduplication effectiveness on ciphertext chunks after encryption
- > Message-locked encryption uses a key derived from chunk

content [Bellare, EuroCrypt'13]

- Enable cross-user deduplication on ciphertext chunks
 - e.g., Key = hash of plaintext chunk
- Server-aided key management
 - Deploy a key server to prevent brute-force attacks [Bellare, Security'13]



Limitations of DaE

- > L1: High key management overhead
 - Storage: store a key for each chunk
 - Performance: key generation overhead is expensive [Ren, ATC'21]
- > L2: Incompatibility with compression
 - Ciphertext chunks cannot be further compressed
 - Compression before encryption → leak compressed chunk lengths [Chen, SYSTOR'21]
- > L3: Security risks
 - Single point-of-attack due to centralized server-aided key management
 - DaE is deterministic → vulnerable to frequency analysis [Li, EuroSys'20]

Deduplication-before-Encryption


- Deduplication-before-Encryption (DbE)
 - We explore DbE, which performs deduplication on plaintext chunks, followed by encrypting non-duplicate chunks
- Benefits over DaE by design
 - Encryption can use content-independent keys (L1 addressed)
 - Compression can be applied on non-duplicate plaintext chunks after deduplication (L2 addressed)
 - Deploying a key server for key generation is unnecessary (L3 addressed)
- Question: how should deduplication be protected?
 - DbE's deduplication process is no longer protected by encryption

Contributions


- DEBE: a shielded DbE-based deduplicated storage system based on shielded execution
 - Explore DbE with aid of Intel SGX
 - Apply frequency-based deduplication for performance and security
- Experiments show that DEBE outperforms conventional DaE approaches in performance, storage savings, and security
 - Up to 13.1x upload speedup over DupLESS [Bellare, Security'13]
 - 93.8% key metadata storage saving over DaE
 - Reduce information leakage without compromising storage efficiency

Intel SGX Basics

- Enclave: secure memory region realized by Intel SGX
 - OCalls and ECalls to interact with untrusted applications
- > SGX limitations in performance
 - Enclave page cache (EPC) has limited size (e.g., 128 MiB)
 - Exceeding EPC size → expensive EPC paging overhead
 - ECalls and OCalls lead to context-switching overhead
- **Challenge:** How to mitigate SGX overhead in DEBE?




Overview



- Target-based deduplication
 - Protect DbE via Intel SGX
 - Perform deduplication and compression over plaintext chunks in enclave
- Communication
 - Control channel: transmit commands for storage operations
 - Data channel: transmit plaintext chunks to enclave
 - Protected by a short-term session key shared by a client and enclave

Main Idea


- > A small fraction of top frequent chunks contribute a large fraction of duplicates
 - In VM, top-5% of frequent chunks contribute to a duplicate rate of 97%



- Frequency-based deduplication: separate deduplication process in two phases based on chunk frequencies
 - First phase: Manage small fingerprint index in enclave to remove most duplicates → mitigate EPC paging overhead
 - Second phase: Manage full index out of enclave to remove remaining few duplicates → reduce context-switching overhead

Architecture


- > Track frequencies of plaintext chunks
- > Frequency-based deduplication
 - Remove duplicates of most frequent chunks
 - Query full index to remove remaining duplicates of less frequent chunks
 - Protect query information via query key



Compress non-duplicate chunks and encrypt compressed chunks via data key


Frequency Tracking

- Use Count-Min Sketch (CM-Sketch) to track approximate frequency of each chunk
 - Fixed memory usage with provable error bounds
 - Divide fingerprint into r pieces for counting
 - Nearly no extra performance overhead



First-Phase Deduplication

- > Remove duplicates from *k* most frequent plaintext chunks
 - Expect to remove a large fraction of duplicates
- ➤ Manage top-k index in enclave
 - Limited EPC usage \rightarrow O(k)
 - Min-heap to differentiate the top-k-frequent and less frequent chunks
 - Hash table to track chunk information for duplicate detection



Second-Phase Deduplication

- > Remove duplicates from remaining less frequent chunks
- ➤ Manage full index outside enclave
 - Protected by query key
 - Hash table: encrypted fingerprint -> encrypted chunk information
- Enclave deterministically encrypts the fingerprint of each remaining plaintext chunk with query key
 - Query full index via Ocalls


Experimental Setup

- ➤ Implement DEBE in C++ on Linux
 - Intel SGX SDK Linux 2.7, OpenSSL 1.1.1, and Intel SGX SSL
 - FastCDC, LZ4
 - ~17.5 K LoC

Datasets


- Five real-world backup workloads: DOCKER, LINUX, FSL, MS, and VM
- > Testbed
 - Multiple machines connected with 10GbE
 - Each machine has Intel Core i5-7500 3.4GHz and 32GiB RAM

Overall Performance




- > Baselines
 - DupLESS [Bellare, Security'13]
 - TED [Li, EuroSys'20]
 - CE [Bellare, EuroCrypt13]
 - Plain (without encryption)
- > DEBE outperforms all DaE approaches in uploads
 - Up to 13.1x speedups over DupLESS
 - Avoid key generation performance overhead
 - Avoid encryption and compression for duplicate data
- > 8.5% download speed drops compared with DaE
 - Load data into enclave for decryption and decompression

Trace-Driven Performance




- ➤ DEBE outperforms CE in uploads
 - FSL: 246.5-277.5 MiB/s in DEBE; 163.5-179.1 MiB/s in CE
- Download speeds of both DEBE and CE are almost identical
 - Throttled by disk I/O

Storage Efficiency



- ➤ In FSL, DEBE saves 93.8% of key metadata compared with DaE
 - DaE: a 32-byte key for each chunk (in AES-256)
 - DEBE: two long-term keys (data key and query key); a 16-byte IV for each non-duplicate chunk
 - As in traditional symmetric encryption

Security



- Quantify frequency leakage by KLD (a.k.a., relative entropy to uniform distribution)
 - Low KLD implies high security
- > Reduce KLD of TED [Li, EuroSys'20] by up to 87.7% in LINUX
 - TED needs to store 15% more data to enhance security

Conclusion

- DEBE realizes DbE via Intel SGX
 - Perform deduplication and compression in enclave
 - Apply frequency-based deduplication
 - Outperform DaE approaches in performance, storage, and security
- > See our paper and technical report for more details
- > Source code: https://github.com/yzr95924/DEBE
 - Received all three artifact badges