


Shortstack:

Distributed, Fault-tolerant, Oblivious Data Access







Kushal



Anurag



Rachit





Yale University






Untrusted



Untrusted






Oblivious Data Access **Untrusted** Input **Access distribution** Key-Value Store **Trusted** 41b 7f5 Client d c16 Client 2ce Output **Access distribution** 41b 7f5 c16 2ce a


Encryption is not enough. Need to hide access patterns


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
Oblivious Data Access: Output distribution independent of input distribution







Existing techniques "flatten" input access distribution into uniform output distribution



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ORAM


Bandwidth Overhead

Large O(log n)

Adversarial Model

Active


(Can inject queries)



Existing techniques "flatten" input access distribution into uniform output distribution

Bandwidth Overhead Large O(log n) Constant (3x)

Adversarial Model Active Honest-but-curious (Can inject queries) (Does not inject queries)



Existing techniques "flatten" input access distribution into uniform output distribution

ORAM Pancake

Bandwidth Overhead Large Offog n

All existing oblivious data access techniques use centralized (stateful) proxy

Adversarial Model Active Honest-but-curious

Challenges with Centralized Oblivious Data Access Systems

- 1. Insecure or unavailable during failures
 - 2. Scalability bottleneck

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
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
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
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





- Replica Creation
- Query Generation
- Query Execution (+temporarily buffer writes to replicas)





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



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



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



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
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




Three important functionalities:

- Replica Creation
- Query Generation
- Query Execution (+temporarily buffer writes to replicas)







Replicas

8

Three important functionalities:

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- Query Generation
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





Replicas


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
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



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























Inconsistency across replicas



Inconsistency across replicas

► Fetch all the replicas of **a** to determine the latest value


Violates Security (correlated accesses)




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




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
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► Fetch the entire database to avoid security violations


Huge bandwidth overhead (large periods of unavailability)



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Violates Security (correlated accesses)



Fetch the entire database to avoid security violations

Huge bandwidth overhead (large periods of unavailability)

Centralized, Stateful, Proxy: Security violation or long periods of unavailability

This work


Challenges with Centralized Oblivious Data Access Systems
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
Design of Shortstack:


Distributed, Fault-tolerant, Oblivious Data Access System

Security model:

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






1. Oblivious data access guarantees, even under failures


- Fail-stop failure model
- Worst-case scenario: Arbitrary (bounded number of) failures at arbitrary times



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2. System Availability




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
3. Scalability: Alleviate bandwidth & compute bottlenecks, throughput linear in #physical-servers





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
Threat Model: Honest-but-curious Adversary (Or, Passive persistent adversary—The Pancake model)

Obliviousness requires output distribution to be independent of input distribution











Partition query execution by Replicas


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


Partition query execution by Replicas



Upon failure, output distribution is uniform over a <u>random subset of replicas</u>


Output distribution is independent of input distribution (realizing our key insight)



Proxy State

a → 41b,9ea
b → 7f5
c → c16
d → 2ce

Partition Proxy state by Keys




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
Partition Proxy state by Keys

Example to provide intuition




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
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


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
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


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


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


Query Generation over all Keys




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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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



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



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





























Trusted




L3 failures: Redistribute requests across remaining servers

Trusted




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
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



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
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


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









Trusted



Shortstack needs 3 physical servers for handling 2 failures

Trusted



Shortstack needs 3 physical servers for handling 2 failures

Shortstack needs f+1 physical servers for handling f failures

This work

Challenges with Centralized Oblivious Data Access Systems
1. Insecure or unavailable during failures
2. Scalability bottleneck

Design of Shortstack:

Distributed, Fault-tolerant, Oblivious Data Access System

Security model:

Enables formal study of Distributed, Fault-tolerant, Oblivious Data Access systems

Existing security models do not capture failures

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New, General, Security Model

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New, General, Security Model

Powerful adversary that cause arbitrary failures (bounded number) at arbitrary times

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Output distribution independent of input distribution (Oblivious data access guarantee)

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
(Formal definitions and proof of Shortstack security in paper)

- ShortStack end-to-end implementation open-sourced
 - Requires no modifications to the server side


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- Goal: Demonstrating throughput scalability with number of physical servers


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
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
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
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- Many additional results in the Paper...
 - 1. System Scalability
 - 2. Fault Tolerance
 - 3. Latency
 - 4. Bottlenecks in each layer
 - 5. Skewed workloads

Conclusion







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https://github.com/pancake-security/shortstack