



# Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications

**Kimberly Ruth**, Tadayoshi Kohno, Franziska Roesner

*University of Washington*

# Emerging AR/MR Technologies



ARCore



# Emerging AR/MR Technologies


Technologies that ***continuously process sensory input*** from the user's surroundings and ***overlay digital content*** on top of the user's perception of the world.




ARCore



# AR Security Research Context



# AR Security Research Context




[Jana, Molnar, Moshchuk, Dunn, Livshits, Wang, & Ofek, 2013]

[Roesner, Molnar, Moshchuk, Kohno, & Wang, 2014]

[Templeman, Korayem, Crandall, & Kapadia, 2014]

[Raval, Srivastava, Razeen, Lebeck, Machanavajjhala, & Cox, 2016]


# AR Security Research Context



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[Lebeck, Kohno, & Roesner, 2016]  
[Lebeck, Ruth, Kohno, & Roesner, 2017]  
[Ahn, Gorlatova, Naghizadeh, Chiang, & Mittal, 2018]










A man and a woman are wearing augmented reality (AR) glasses, looking at a 3D architectural model of a city. The model consists of various buildings and structures, with glowing green lines and points overlaid on it, suggesting a digital overlay or data visualization. The background is a bright, modern office or laboratory setting with large windows.


Amazing new technology...  
... what could possibly go wrong?




Private content is publicly visible




John Doe:  
This is a  
reminder  
that your  
credit card  
payment is  
overdue.



Private content is publicly visible



Virtual vandalism




Private content is publicly visible



John Doe:  
This is a reminder  
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Virtual  
vandalism



Violation of user's  
personal space

↓ KICK ME




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# Precursors Today

In VR:

- Sexual harassment occurs between player avatars
- Offensive remarks and standing in personal space is a meme



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In VR:

- Sexual harassment occurs between player avatars
- Offensive remarks and standing in personal space is a meme

In smartphone AR:

- Virtual “Balloon Dog” sculpture vandalized in Snapchat
- Unauthorized AR content in MoMA Picasso exhibit



Goal: Design multi-user AR security and  
privacy primitives

# Case Studies as Design Development Tool

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Opt-in, co-located: **Paintball**




# Case Studies as Design Development Tool

Opt-in, co-located: **Paintball**



Opt-in, not co-located: **Multi-Team Whiteboards**




# Case Studies as Design Development Tool


Opt-in, co-located: **Paintball**



Opt-in, not co-located: **Multi-Team Whiteboards**



Opt-out, co-located: **Community Art**



# Threat Model

Scope: multiple users of a single application


Untrustworthy users may attempt to:

# Threat Model

Scope: multiple users of a single application

Untrustworthy users may attempt to:

1. **Share unwanted AR content** with other users






# Threat Model

Scope: multiple users of a single application

Untrustworthy users may attempt to:

1. **Share unwanted AR content** with other users
2. **See private AR content** belonging to another user




# Threat Model


Scope: multiple users of a single application

Untrustworthy users may attempt to:

1. **Share unwanted AR content** with other users
2. **See private AR content** belonging to another user
3. **Perform unwanted manipulations on AR content** belonging to another user



Goal: Design multi-user AR security and privacy primitives that *protect users from each other*



Goal: Design *functionality-friendly*  
multi-user AR security and privacy  
primitives that protect users from each  
other

# One Size Does Not Fit All



VS.



# One Size Does Not Fit All



- Both involve attaching virtual content to users



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- Both involve attaching virtual content to users
- Bad vs. good is dependent on application semantics





# One Size Does Not Fit All



- Both involve attaching virtual content to users
- Bad vs. good is dependent on application semantics
- Cannot distinguish these in a general-purpose solution



Goal: Design functionality-friendly multi-user AR security and privacy primitives that *help developers* to protect users from each other

Goal: Design *functionality-friendly*  
multi-user AR security and privacy  
primitives that *help developers* to *protect*  
*users from each other*

# Approach: App-Level Developer Toolkit

- Benefit: packaging controls behind an API reduces developer burden
- Benefit: lack of reliance on OS support facilitates ease of deployment in practice
- Benefit: opens possibility of cross-platform compatibility
- Limitation: cannot protect against misuse or abuse by app developer

# Design Components

	<b>Outbound sharing controls</b>	<b>Inbound sharing controls</b>
<b>What and with whom?</b>		
<b>Where?</b>		
<b>How much?</b>		

# Design Components

	<b>Outbound sharing controls</b>	<b>Inbound sharing controls</b>
<b>What and with whom?</b>	Permission management	Two-party sharing consent
<b>Where?</b>	Location coupling	Personal space
<b>How much?</b>	Private content in a shared world	Clutter management

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Key challenge: integration with physical 3D space

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
# Problem: Private Content in a Shared World



John Doe:  
This is a  
reminder  
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
# Problem: Private Content in a Shared World

Left user's view: virtual content obscured




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

Right user's view: no behavioral cue



# Problem: Private Content in a Shared World

Left user's view: virtual content obscured


Right user's view: no behavioral cue




# Solution: Ghosting

*User's view:*

John Doe:  
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


*Others' view:*




# Solution: Ghosting

Left user's view: full virtual content




Right user's view: behavioral cue



# Implementation: ShareAR

- App-level library written for Microsoft HoloLens
- Assumes Unity development environment
- Network shim layer uses Microsoft MixedRealityToolkit Sharing; can be swapped out to use another networking solution



# Evaluation

1. Analysis of compatibility with existing design recommendations






# Evaluation

1. Analysis of compatibility with existing design recommendations
2. Construction of representative case study applications




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


# Evaluation

1. Analysis of compatibility with existing design recommendations
2. Construction of representative case study applications
3. Assessment of case study applications' security properties



# Evaluation

1. Analysis of compatibility with existing design recommendations
2. Construction of representative case study applications
3. Assessment of case study applications' security properties
4. Performance measurement, scaling with number of users and number of objects



# Evaluation

Continued evaluation in practice:

- 2 undergraduates this summer building apps using ShareAR
- Toolkit available for other developers and researchers to download; looking for further feedback from practical use
- Visit [arsharingtoolkit.com](https://arsharingtoolkit.com) to try it out



Henry Bowman



AJ Kruse

# Summary

**Multi-user AR security** is a topic that warrants the attention of the security community.

**Security is not enough:** practicality requires building security solutions based on functionality requirements.

**This work contributes:**

- A set of **goals** for a multi-user AR security framework,
- A **design** that meets those goals, and
- An **implementation** that helps multi-user AR app developers in practice to achieve functionality and security.



# Acknowledgements




Franziska  
Roesner



Tadayoshi  
Kohno



AJ Kruse



Henry  
Bowman



Security and Privacy Lab



Funders

Project website: [arsharingtoolkit.com](https://arsharingtoolkit.com)

Questions? Kimberly Ruth – [kcr32@cs.washington.edu](mailto:kcr32@cs.washington.edu)