

# A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link


Milan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich,  
David Kreitschmann, Guevara Noubir, and Matthias Hollick



TECHNISCHE  
UNIVERSITÄT  
DARMSTADT



# Opening Up Apple's Wireless Ecosystem



# Vulnerabilities and Attacks

## User Tracking


Revealing MAC address and hostname

*CVE-2019-8567*  
*CVE-2019-8620*

```

▼ Tag: Arpa
  Tag Number: Arpa (16)
  Tag Length: 16
  Flags: 0x03
▶ Arpa: Noahs-Iphone.local
    
```


**Remote activation**  
Brute force attack on Bluetooth LE discovery  
*fixed in iOS 12.2*



## Denial-of-Service

Breaking communication via desynchronization

*CVE-2019-8612*



## (Selective) Blackout

Crashing devices wirelessly through corrupt frames

*CVE-2018-4368*



First two targets crashed

## Man-in-the-Middle


Intercepting files transmitted via AirDrop  
*fixed in iOS 13 beta*







# Discovery: Bluetooth



$H_1 = \text{SHA256}(\dots@icloud.com)$  (your Apple ID)

$H_n$  include associated phone numbers and other email addresses

only if any  $H_{1..4}[0 : 1]$  in address book



# Discovery: Bonjour



Jane

Ask for AirDrop service

Service available at  
instance `1fa518393a98 PTR`

Instance `1fa518393a98` is at  
`Johns-iPhone.local:8770 SRV`

IPv6 of `Johns-iPhone.local` is  
`fe80::90b6:7ff:fecc:46 AAAA`



John



# Authentication: HTTPS


Find out whether we are mutual contacts



Jane

TLS connection with client and server certificates\*

HTTP POST /Discover with sender's record data\*\*




John

\* Common name: com.apple.idms.appleid.prd.UUID

\*\*  $RD = UUID, H_1, \dots, H_n$   
 $RD_\sigma = RD, \text{sign}(\sigma_{Apple}, RD)$




# Authentication: HTTPS



**TLS** connection with  
client and server certificates\*

**HTTP POST /Discover**  
with sender's record data\*\*




John

1. Verify signature of  $RD_\sigma$
2.  $UUID \in RD \leftrightarrow \sigma_{UUID}$  ✓
3.  $\exists H_i \in RD : H_i \in \text{address book}$

\* Common name: com.apple.  
idms.appleid.prd. $UUID$

\*\*  $RD = UUID, H_1, \dots, H_n$   
 $RD_\sigma = RD, \text{sign}(\sigma_{Apple}, RD)$


# Authentication: HTTPS




\* Common name: com.apple.idms.appleid.prd.UUID

\*\*  $RD = UUID, H_1, \dots, H_n$   
 $RD_\sigma = RD, \text{sign}(\sigma_{Apple}, RD)$

# Data Transfer: HTTPS




# Data Transfer: HTTPS





# Vulnerabilities and Attacks

**Remote activation**  
 Brute force attack on  
 Bluetooth LE discovery  
*fixed in iOS 12.2*




**User Tracking**  
 Revealing MAC address  
 and hostname  
*CVE-2019-8567*  
*CVE-2019-8620*


```

    ▼ Tag: Arpa
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
**Denial-of-Service**  
 Breaking communication  
 via desynchronization  
*CVE-2019-8612*



**(Selective) Blackout**  
 Crashing devices wirelessly  
 through corrupt frames  
*CVE-2018-4368*



**Man-in-the-Middle**  
 Intercepting files  
 transmitted via AirDrop  
*fixed in iOS 13 beta*




# Tracking: Vulnerability Analysis

- ▼ Apple Wireless Direct Link action frame, Subtype: MIF
  - ▶ Fixed parameters
  - ▼ Tagged parameters (476 bytes)
    - ▶ Tag: Synchronization Parameters
    - ▶ Tag: Election Parameters
    - ▶ Tag: Channel Sequence
    - ▶ Tag: Election Parameters v2
    - ▼ Tag: Data Path State
      - Tag Number: Data Path State (12)
      - Tag Length: 47
      - ▶ Flags: 0x9f23, Infrastructure BSSID and Channel, Infrastructure Address
      - Country Code: US
      - ▶ Social Channel Map: 0x0007, Channel 6, Channel 44, Channel 149
      - Infrastructure BSSID: ArubaAHe\_ (70:3a:0e: )
      - Infrastructure Channel: 104
      - Infrastructure Address: :00:a2:60 ( :00:a2:60)
  - ▼ Tag: Arpa
    - Tag Number: Arpa (16)
    - Tag Length: 16
    - Flags: 0x03
    - ▶ Arpa: Noahs-Iphone.local
    - ▶ Tag: Version



# Tracking: Remote Activation



0000, 0001, 0002, 0003


0004, 0005, 0006, 0007

...

FFFC, FFFD, FFFE, FFFF

30.72 s


**Brute Force Analysis**



Source: microbit.org

**Implementation**


136 contacts on average



**Experimental Evaluation**


# Tracking: Experimental Results

# devices discovered in 1 min



**~2x devices discovered**

persons' names in hostnames



**75% include person's name  
(68% include the actual name)**



# Tracking: Mitigation

## ▼ Apple Wireless Direct Link action frame, Subtype: MIF

- ▶ Fixed parameters
- ▼ Tagged parameters (476 bytes)
  - ▶ Tag: Synchronization Parameters
  - ▶ Tag: Election Parameters
  - ▶ Tag: Channel Sequence
  - ▶ Tag: Election Parameters v2
  - ▼ Tag: Data Path State
    - Tag Number: Data Path State (12)
    - Tag Length: 47
    - ▶ Flags: 0x9f23, Infrastructure BSSID and Channel, Infrastructure Address
    - Country Code: US
    - ▶ Social Channel Map: 0x0007, Channel 6, Channel 44, Channel 149
    - ~~Infrastructure BSSID: ArubaAHC\_ (78.3a.0c. )~~ **CVE-2019-8620**
    - Infrastructure Channel: 104
    - ~~Infrastructure Address: .00.a2.00 ( .00.a2.00 )~~ **CVE-2019-8567**
  - ▼ Tag: Arpa
    - Tag Number: Arpa (16)
    - Tag Length: 16
    - Flags: 0x03
    - ▶ Arpa: **4C89134E-13CF-4A56-BF79-B72D74CE679E.local**
    - ▶ Tag: Version

*hostname randomization  
found in iOS 13 beta*




# MitM: Recall AirDrop Authentication






# MitM: Ambiguous Receiver Authentication State







# MitM: Breaking Authentication via DoS




# MitM: Identity Spoofing



# MitM: Relaying Thumbnail




# MitM: Replacing File





# MitM: Mitigation

- Contacts ✓
- Own devices ✓
- Others ✗



New sharing pane in iOS 13 beta

# Software



## OpenDrop

AirDrop implementation written in Python



## OWL

AWDL implementation written in C



Jerry Gamblin   
@JGamblin


... and more at  
<https://owlink.org>

Running an airdrop honeypot in Las Vegas has been more hilarious than I ever imagined.

```
Announcing service: host shrug, address fe80::d413:67ff:fe67:c417, port 8771
Starting HTTPS server
Receiving file(s) ...
File(s) received (size 0.31 MB, speed 7.40 MB/s)
```

# CVE

*CVE-2018-4368*  
*CVE-2019-8567*  
*CVE-2019-8620*  
*CVE-2019-8612*



possibly more to come in iOS 13 and macOS 10.15

# Outlook

**More services** in Apple's wireless ecosystem (Handoff, Auto Unlock, ...)

AWDL's successor **Neighbor Awareness Network (NAN)** is likely coming soon to xOS

