

Two cartoon robots, one on the left and one on the right, are holding a long, dark, wavy banner. The robots are grey with blue eyes and red mouths. The banner contains the text "PRAGMATIC SECURITY FOR SRE" in large, white, bold, sans-serif capital letters.


PRAGMATIC SECURITY FOR SRE

VERICA

@WICKETT

@WICKETT


- Head of Research @ Verica
- Org of DevOpsDays Austin
- Org of DevSecOpsDays Austin
- LinkedIn Learning author on DevOps and Security Courses <http://lnkd.in/JamesWickett>
- Find me at wickett.me



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
Free book for attendees!
verica.io/book



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Paying \$1,500 to browse Twitter and hang out on Slack



Half-listening to Conference Talks

In Depth


@ThePracticalDev

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ORLY?

@WICKETT

Letting your baby out of the nest — for better or worse



Good Enough to Ship

The Definitive Guide

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
A person wearing a black hoodie stands in a digital, grid-like environment. The background is a dark space filled with a grid of glowing purple and blue lines that recede into the distance. The overall atmosphere is futuristic and digital. The text "Ah yes, security" is overlaid in white, sans-serif font across the lower portion of the image.

Ah yes, security


Companies are spending a great deal on security, but we read of massive computer-related attacks. Clearly something is wrong.

The root of the problem is twofold:

we're **protecting the wrong things**,
and **we're hurting productivity** in the process.





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
[Security by risk assessment] introduces a dangerous fallacy: that structured inadequacy is almost as good as adequacy and that underfunded security efforts plus risk management are about as good as properly funded security work



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many security teams work with a worldview where their goal is to inhibit change as much as possible



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Wendy Nather
@wendynather



It's pronounced "scapegoat." You're welcome.



Andrew Bissett @drewbissett · Jan 18


Ok #infosec friends- we've gotta get on the same page. How do we say CISO?

RT to help settle the question.

[Show this poll](#)

11:44 AM · Jan 18, 2020 · [Twitter for iPhone](#)

31 Retweets **230** Likes



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Putting off critical tasks until everyone forgets about them




Getting Around to
Security Next Month

If there's time

CULTURE IS THE MOST
IMPORTANT ASPECT TO
DEVOPS SUCCEEDING IN
THE ENTERPRISE


- PATRICK DEBOIS

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
DevSecOps is a cultural movement that furthers the movements of Agile and DevOps into Security



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SRE, also known as the people who actually get things done.




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

SRE TO THE RESCUE

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Reliability and Security Tradeoffs







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At what point in the development process does your organization perform automated application security analysis?

Mature DevOps practices are 350% more likely to integrate automated security.






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Source: 2019 DevSecOps Community Survey

SECURITY TOOLCHAIN FOR CI/CD




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

DevSecOps – Tooling & Assurance Examples (Shift Left)



<https://www.slideshare.net/MichaelMan11/devsecops-pipeline-example-not-just-tools>



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
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<https://www.sans.org/security-resources/posters/appsec/secure-devops-toolchain-swat-checklist-60>


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Secure Software Supply Chain

1. Gating processes are not Deming-like
2. Security is a design constraint
3. Decisions made by engineering teams
4. It's hard to avoid business catastrophes by applying one-size-fits-all strategies
5. Security defects is more like a *security "recall"*



Secure Software Supply Chain presented by Shannon Leitz at DevOps Days Austin 2016.



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Develop


Inherit

Build

Deploy

Operate

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The design and development of an application and its features. Including all the development practices like version control, sprint planning, unit-testing.

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Security Activities and Considerations

- **Threat Modeling**
- **Security Stories**
- **Authentication to Push**
- **Development Standards**
- **Peer Review**
- **Static Code Analysis**
- **Unit Tests for Security**

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Threat Modeling and Security Stories

- The Threat Modeling Book
- OWASP App Threat Modeling [Cheat Sheet](#)
- Evil User Stories ([link](#))
- OWASP [Application Security Verification Standard](#)
- OWASP [threatdragon.org](https://www.threatdragon.org)
- Mozilla Rapid Risk Assessment ([link](#))



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Development Standards

- **Pre-commit Hooks for Security**
- **Coding Standards (Security and otherwise)**
- **Peer Review**
- **Single Mainline Branch**
- **Linting and Code Hygiene**

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Code Standards and Team Tooling

- **gometalinter** if you use golang or find one for whatever your language of choice
- **gofmt** formats the code automatically and makes everything look the same, easier for everyone to grok (again, this is specific to golang)



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Keeping Secrets Out of Codebase

- **git-secrets** Prevents you from committing passwords and other sensitive information to a git repository. From awslabs. ([link](#))
- **git-hound** Hound is a Git plugin that helps prevent sensitive data from being committed into a repository by sniffing potential commits against PCRE regular expressions. ([link](#))

- **Other Resources:**

- Talisman [link](#)
- Repo Supervisor [link](#)

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
A Bug is a Bug is a Bug Philosophy

Security testing where other error testing lives. In the IDE, in local build env, and in CI system.

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Just memorize these fourteen contextually dependant instructions



Exiting Vim

Eventually

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Static Code Analysis

- **Not unfamiliar territory for security pros**
- **Static Application Security Testing (SAST)**
- **IDE Plugin if possible**
- **Open Source:** Brakeman (Ruby), FindSecurityBugs (Java), Phan (PHP), gosec (golang), Puma (C#)
- **Paid:** Brakeman Pro, Veracode, Fortify, ...

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
Open Source SAST Options

Language / framework	Scanning tool
C/C++	Flawfinder
Go	Gosec
Java	find-sec-bugs
Javascript	ESLint
.NET	Security Code Scan
Node.js	NodeJsScan
PHP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Phan• Phpcs-security-audit
Python	bandit
Ruby / Ruby on Rails	brakeman
Scala	find-sec-bugs

Compiled from: GitLab, SANS, OWASP|

2:23 PM - 17 Aug 2018

16 Retweets 43 Likes



10



16



43



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Unit Testing for Security

- **Unit Testing is the currency of Developers**
- **JUnit, Rspec, Testing (golang),**
- **Goal is to have security tests being written with other unit tests or whatever testing patterns you use: TDD, BDD, ATDD, ...**

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Questions to Ask

Are the developers testing for security locally before it gets to the CI system?

Do we practice good hygiene and coding practices?

Are we preventing secrets from leaking into version control?

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
Operate

This is an overlooked phase because it is the most invisible as software dependencies get bundled in and inherited in our own code and upstream.

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“What did I do to deserve this?”



Resolving Broken Dependencies

This is Your Life Now

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Security Considerations

- **This is your real LOC count!**
- **The Software Delivery Supply Chain**
- **Publish a Bill of Materials and trace back**
- **This is not just application dependencies and libraries, but also OS-level (remember shellshock, heartbleed, ..)**

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
Deploy


Operate

Language Tooling

- **bundler-audit** - checks for vulnerable versions of gems in your ruby code ([link](#))
- **OWASP Dep Check** - mostly Java
- **nsp** - node security platform ([link](#))
- **Paid options:** Sonatype, Snyk, BlackDuck, JFrog

- **Retire.js** - known vuln JS libs ([link](#))



View on GitHub 

Retire.js

What you require you must also retire

tar.gz .zip

There is a plethora of JavaScript libraries for use on the web and in node.js apps out there. This greatly simplifies, but we need to stay update on security fixes. "Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities" is now a part of the [OWASP Top 10](#) and insecure libraries can pose a huge risk for your webapp. The goal of Retire.js is to help you detect use of version with known vulnerabilities.

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- **Over 30% of containers in Docker Hub have high sev vulns ([source](#))**
- **Open Source:** Docker Bench for Security, Clair, falco, anchore, ...
- **Paid Options:** aqua, twistlock

Speaker Deck Published on Feb 6, 2017

Gareth Rushgrove
61 Presentations

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Published in Technology

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What's Inside That Container?

Containers and config management in the real world

Gareth Rushgrove
Puppet

puppet

What's Inside That Container? by Gareth Rushgrove
Published February 6, 2017 in Technology

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Questions to Ask

What have I bundled into my app that is making vulnerable?

Am I publishing a Bill of Materials with my application?

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This phase is where the CI build system runs all the build steps and does acceptance testing. Previous testing and tooling gets verified here.

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Security Considerations

- **Outside-In Security Testing**
- **Infra as Code (Testing)**
- **Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)**
- **Compliance on every build!**
- **Cloud provider config as code**
- **Using containers**

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Dynamic Application Security Scanners

- These all require tuning and can be difficult to integrate into build pipelines.
- Application Security scanners: Nikto, Arachni, ZAP, sqlmap, xsser,
- Other - SSLyze, nmap, ssh_scan
- See Kali Linux
- Paid: Qualys, AppScan, BurpSuite, ...

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The goal should be to come up with a set of automated tests that probe and check security configurations and runtime system behavior for security features that will execute every time the system is built and every time it is deployed.



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
Framework with Security testing written in a natural language that developers, security and operations can understand.

Gauntlt wraps security testing tools but does not install tools

Gauntlt was built to be part of the CI/CD pipeline

Open source, MIT License,

gauntlt.org



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GauntIt Example

What?

```
@slow @final
Feature: Look for cross site scripting (xss) using arachni
against a URL
```

Given

```
Scenario: Using arachni, look for cross site scripting and verify
no issues are found
```

```
Given "arachni" is installed
```

```
And the following profile:
```

name	value
url	http://localhost:8008

When

```
When I launch an "arachni" attack with:
```

```
"""
```

```
arachni -check=xss* <url>
```


```
"""
```

Then

```
Then the output should contain "0 issues were detected."
```

“We have saved millions of dollars using Gauntlt for the largest healthcare industry project.”

- Aaron Rinehart, UnitedHealthCare



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A Whole Course on Security Testing with Gauntlt

The screenshot shows a LinkedIn Learning course page for 'Security Testing'. The breadcrumb trail is 'Developer > Cloud Computing'. The course title is 'Security Testing'. In the top right, there are options for 'Layout', 'Add to Playlist', 'Share', and a menu icon. On the left, there is a 'Contents' sidebar with a search bar and a list of video chapters. The main content area features a large video player with a 'Watch Now' button and a play icon. Below the video player, there is an 'Overview' section with tabs for 'Overview', 'Transcript', 'View Offline', and 'Exercise Files'. The 'Overview' section includes the author's name and photo (James Wickett), the release date (3/29/2018), a Creative Commons license icon, a skill level indicator (Intermediate), and the course duration (1h 35m).

Developer > Cloud Computing
Security Testing Layout Add to Playlist Share ...

Contents Notebook

Search This Course

▼ **Introduction**

- Welcome 57s
- What you should know 39s

▼ **1. Security Testing Basics**


- Security and DevOps history in short 4m 31s
- Security and DevOps for the first time 5m 19s
- Automated security testing basics 4m 32s
- Tips for security automation for DevOps 3m 39s

▼ **2. Security Automation: Getting Started**

- Setting up the demo environment 5m 5s
- Web application security quick tour 4m 3s
- Application security attack tools 5m 19s
- Security test automation with Gauntlt

Overview Transcript View Offline Exercise Files

Author **Released** 3/29/2018 CC


James Wickett

Security testing is a vital part of ensuring you deliver a complete, secure solution to your customers. Automating the process can ensure testing is always part of your software delivery workflow, and can help testing keep pace with continuous integration and delivery (CI/CD) pipelines. In this course, James Wickett introduces the core concepts behind application security testing, with hands-on demos of various open-source tools. He explains

Skill Level
Intermediate

Duration
1h 35m

<https://www.linkedin.com/learning/devsecops-automated-security-testing/welcome>

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Infrastructure and Compliance

- **Test Kitchen** - <https://kitchen.ci/>
- **Serverspec** - <http://serverspec.org/>
- **InSpec** - Continuous Compliance Testing [link](#)
- **Cloud Provider is Infrastructure too**
- **Version and test Cloud Config**

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Questions to Ask

Am I testing for security low hanging fruit?

Am I arming my pipeline with attack tools to exercise my application?

Have I validated the previous two phases of testing in secure build environment?

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
Operate

The phase where software moves from our testing to where customers are able to operate it for the first time.

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Security by optimism and prayer



Expert

Hoping Nobody
Hacks You

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

Security Considerations

- **Watch out for Compliance**
- **Secrets Management**
- **Deploy Accountability**
- **Authorization and Logging**
- **Monitoring Deploys**
- **Infra as Code (Execution)**
- **Repeatable Execution**

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
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Roughly 10,000
deploys in the last
2.5 yrs



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
[Deploys] can be treated as standard or routine changes that have been pre-approved by management, and that don't require a heavyweight change review meeting.



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Separation of Duties Considered Harmful



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DevOps Audit Defense Toolkit: https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/228391/Corporate/DevOps_Audit_Defense_Toolkit_v1.0.pdf

Risk Management Theater: <https://continuousdelivery.com/2013/08/riskmanagement-theatre/>

Continuous Delivery and ITIL Change management: <https://continuousdelivery.com/2010/11/continuous-delivery-and-til-changemanagement/>

DevOps Kata – deploy a single line of code: <http://devopsy.com/blog/2013/08/16/devops-kata-single-line-of-code/>

Lean Enterprise Chapter 12: <http://shop.oreilly.com/product/0636920030355.do>



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source: Jim Bird's [SANS preso](#)

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Dear Auditor,



a love letter to auditors from devops,
where we promise to make life better

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Dear Auditor,

We realize that we have been changing things in a rapid fashion from Agile and DevOps to Cloud and Containers. Yes, we have been busy, and are having great success delivering faster than ever, with better quality and supporting the business response to competitive pressures. This isn't just icing on the cake, the only sustainable advantage in our industries is the ability to meet customer demands faster, more reliably than our competitors.

With all this growth, we made a mistake, we forgot to bring you along for

- We will bring you along
- We will be fully transparent about our development process
- We do realize that we own the risks
- We will maintain an open channel of discussion to demonstrate to you how we manage risks with our modern development practices

The DevOps community has been experimenting quite a bit over the last number of years and common practice represents the collective wisdom across many companies, industries, and countries.

We have compiled a list of audit concerns and documented them in a [DevOps Risk Control Matrix](#) with lot of details around the controls, our practices and evidences that are collected to support the control. We hope [this matrix](#) provides a way to collaborate.

Please don't misinterpret that we are backing down from speed and providing value, but we are really excited to move forward, together.

XOXO,

The DevOps Community

Develop

Inherit

Build

Deploy

Operate

Monitoring Cloud Configuration

- **Paid Cloud Config security:** Evident.io, ThreatStack, AlienVault, and more
- **Cloud Provider:** AWS CloudTrail, Inspector, GuardDuty

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Questions to Ask

What secrets are needed to move my application from development into production?

Am I testing for Compliance on each and every deploy?

Is there a repeatable mechanism to push changes to production?

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The runtime state of the application, where users interact with or consume the application. Our application in production.

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


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Security in the operate phase is only successful if it creates learning feedback for developers.



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Security Considerations

- **Security Chaos Engineering and creating stability through instability**
- **Circuit Breakers and Bulkheads**
- **Instrumentation and Visualization**
- **Application security and service abuse and misuse**
- **Bug Bounties**
- **Red Teaming as a Service**

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Detect what matters


Account takeover attempts

Areas of the site under attack

Most likely vectors of attack

Business logic flows

Abuse and Misuse signals



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
Deploy

Operate

Do it because you have to

Runtime Defense

- **Roll your own** (previous slide)
- **Pro-tip: Avoid adding appsec defense at the CDN**
- **Paid NGWAF / RASP Options**




Implementing

**The Mandated
WAF**

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Red Team Mondays
(Intuit does it, so can you)
-Shannon Lietz



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
**THE SHOW IS SUPPOSED
TO BE ABOUT ME!**

**CHAOS
ENGINEERING**



me

**SECURITY CHAOS
ENGINEERING**



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Security Chaos Engineering

The identification of security control failures through proactive experimentation to build confidence in the system's ability to defend against malicious conditions in production.



source: Aaron Rinehart

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4 Steps to Security Chaos Engineering

1. Define expected behavior of a security defense
2. Hypothesize that when security turbulence is introduced it will be either prevented, remediated, or detected.
3. Introduce a variable that introduces security turbulence.
4. Try to disprove the hypothesis by looking for a difference in expected behavior and actual behavior



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O'REILLY®

Security Chaos Engineering

Gaining Confidence in Resilience
and Safety at Speed and Scale


Aaron Rinehart & Kelly Shortridge

REPORT

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The
Pragmatic
Programmers

Release It!

Second Edition

Design and Deploy
Production-Ready Software



Michael T. Nygard
Edited by Katharine Dvorak

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Questions to Ask

Do you know if you are under attack at this current moment?

Do you know what the attackers are going after?

Can I turn on and off services independently if being attacked?


Are we doing security chaos experiments?

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Stay in touch

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