



# POTUS: Probing Off-The-shelf USB drivers with Symbolic fault injection

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# USB Device Drivers are a Problem

- Drivers are buggy
  - Drivers have 3-7 times higher number of bug reports than the core kernel
- Lots of old device drivers
  - OSs want to support as many devices as possible
- High privilege
  - Kernel modules run in ring 0

USB drivers present an easy attack vector for exploitation!

# POTUS

- Semi-Automated testing framework for Linux USB device drivers

- Fault Injection

- Concurrency Fuzzing


- Selective Symbolic Execution

- Emulate generic USB devices

- Detect memory errors and data races in the kernel

# What is S2E?

Select module of interest  
for symbolic execution



*/usr/bin/cp*


*uas.ko*

*scsi.ko*

*uas.ko*


*/usr/bin/cp*

Select analysis plugins for  
evaluation or path selection




# USB 101

- Master-Slave protocol, controlled by a Host Controller Interface (**HCI**)
- At the “software level” – communication is done via Universal Request Blocks (**URBs**)
- Transfer data to **endpoints** by scheduling **URB** transfers
- Devices identify by providing a set of **descriptors**



# System Overview



Symbolic Execution

Fault Injection

Concurrency Fuzzing

Error Detection

# usb-generic

- Extended QEMU device model
- USB from JSON
  - String Descriptors
  - Device Descriptors
  - Interface Descriptors
  - Class Descriptors
  - Endpoint Descriptors

```
{  
  bInterfaceNumber: 0,  
  bNumEndpoints: 2,  
  bInterfaceClass: 8,  
  bInterfaceSubClass: 6,  
  bInterfaceProtocol: 50,  
  eps: [  
    {  
      bEndPointAddress: 1,  
      bmAttributes: 1,  
      wMaxPacketSize: 512  
    },  
    ...  
  ]  
}
```

```
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -device usb-generic,cfg=config.json
```



Symbolic Execution

Fault Injection

Concurrency Fuzzing

Error Detection

# usb-generic

- Host defined time, size and direction of URBs
- Inject symbolic or concrete data into **IN** requests, disregard data from **OUT** requests
- Inject delays and errors into URB requests by returning **STALL**, **NYET** and **NAK**
- Predefined routines for standard requests used during device enumeration e.g. **GET\_DESCRIPTOR**

Symbolic Execution


Fault Injection

Concurrency Fuzzing

Error Detection

# Exercising Drivers

- Random **stress test** of interfaces exposed by drivers
- Expose concurrency errors by running operations simultaneously
- Pick an operation at random from a weighted tree which is performed on file descriptors
- Every time **sys\_open** is called, **fork** the user space driver exerciser, operate on both file descriptors



Symbolic Execution

Fault Injection

Concurrency Fuzzing

Error Detection

# Injecting Faults

- **SystemTap** and kprobes kernel infrastructure
- Inject symbolic data and **symbolic faults**
- Typically, errors in the kernel are of the form **-ERRNO**
- Tapset libraries for hooking core kernel modules

```
probe module("v4l2").function("video_register_device").return {
    child = s2e_fork()
    if (child) {
        s2e_log(__FUNC_NAME__ . " :: Injecting fault.\n")
        s2e_annotate(@FAULT_KEY, annotation + 1)
        video_unregister_device(@entry($vdev))
        $return = s2e_get_symb_fault(32)
    }
}
```

USB Hardware

*usbcore*

Client USB Driver

Driver Exerciser




/dev/usb/XYZ  
sys\_open()



Time






Time

USB Hardware


*usbcore*


Client USB Driver

Driver Exerciser




Time









# Airspy SDR

- Local DoS
- Present since 2013 or Linux 3.17 – 4.6
- *drivers/media/usb/airspy/airspy.c*
- CVE-2016-5400
- Debian/Ubuntu/Arch Linux



Airspy Mini

"The X-MEN version of RTL-SDR"

Simply the best SDR Dongle!

```

static int airspy_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
    s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct airspy), GFP_KERNEL);
    ret = v4l2_device_register(&intf->dev, &s->v4l2_dev);

    /* Register controls */
    v4l2_ctrl_handler_init(&s->hdl, 5);
    s->lna_gain_auto = v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&s->hdl, &airspy_ctrl_ops,
        V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_LNA_GAIN_AUTO, 0, 1, 1, 0);
    ...

    ret = video_register_device(&s->vdev, VFL_TYPE_SDR, -1);
    if (ret) {
        dev_err(s->dev, "Failed to register as video device (%d)\n",
            ret);
        goto err_unregister_v4l2_dev;
    }
    ...
    return 0;

err_free_controls:
    v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(&s->hdl);
err_unregister_v4l2_dev:
    v4l2_device_unregister(&s->v4l2_dev);
err_free_mem:
    kfree(s);
    return ret;
}

```

Can be triggered purely from hardware!

# Lego USB Tower

- Local DoS or Local Privilege Escalation
- Present since 2002 or Linux 2.6 – 4.7
- *drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c*
- *CVE-2017-XXXX*
- *Debian/Ubuntu/Arch/Fedora/RHEL*



```
static int tower_probe (struct usb_interface *interface, const struct usb_device_id *id){
```

```
...
```

```
/* we can register the device now, as it is ready */  
usb_set_intfdata (interface, dev);
```

```
retval = usb_register_dev (interface, &tower_class);
```

```
...
```

```
/* get the firmware version and log it */
```

```
result = usb_control_msg (udev,  
                           usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0),  
                           LEGO_USB_TOWER_REQUEST_GET_VERSION,  
                           USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_DEVICE,  
                           0, 0, get_version_reply, sizeof(*get_version_reply),  
                           1000);
```

```
if (result < 0) {  
    dev_err(idev, "LEGO USB Tower get version control request failed\n");  
    retval = result;  
    goto error;  
}
```

```
...
```

```
error:
```

```
kfree(get_version_reply);  
tower_delete(dev);  
return retval;
```

```
}
```

```

static inline void tower_delete (struct lego_usb_tower *dev)
{
    tower_abort_transfers (dev);

    /* free data structures */
    usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt_in_urb);
    usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt_out_urb);
    kfree (dev->read_buffer);
    kfree (dev->interrupt_in_buffer);
    kfree (dev->interrupt_out_buffer);
    kfree (dev);
}

```

```

static ssize_t tower_write (struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
                           size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
    ...
    bytes_to_write = min_t(int, count, write_buffer_size);
    dev_dbg(&dev->udev->dev, "%s: count = %zd, bytes_to_write = %zd\n",
           __func__, count, bytes_to_write);

    if (copy_from_user (dev->interrupt_out_buffer, buffer, bytes_to_write)) {
        retval = -EFAULT;
        goto unlock_exit;
    }
    ...
}

```

# Exploit – Lego USB Tower

- Can we build a UaF that is a **data-only** attack and will bypass **SMEP**, **SMAP** and PAX's **RAP**?
  1. Inject maximum delay into `REQUEST_GET_VERSION`
  2. Have user space call `sys_open()`
  3. Wait for the 1 second timeout
  4. Remap the `dev struct` in the general kernel cache
  5. Change the values for `dev->interrupt_out_buffer`
  6. Overwrite `{,fs,e}{u,g}id`
  7. Repeat 5-6 to overwrite **capabilities**

Relaxed conditions to bypass  
KASLR and memory allocation!

# Future Work

- Slow!
  - Interval URBs – *usb\_fill\_int\_urb(..., \$interval)*
  - State explosion due to (symbex<sup>faults</sup>)driver operations
- Some paths we can't explore!
  - Concretization of data – real device may help
- `usb-generic`  $\subseteq$  USB 2.0
  - USB On-The-Go (OTG), USB 3.0



# Conclusion

- Abstract hardware interface
  - OS agnostic, CPU architecture agnostic
- Semi-Automated USB Driver Test Framework
  - Concurrency Fuzzing
  - Fault Injection
  - Selective Symbolic Execution
- Two 0-days in the Linux kernel, proof of concept for data-only LPE



# Symbolic Execution

```
int myfunc(int x)
{
  int r = 0;

  if(x > 8){
    r = x - 7;
  }

  if(x < 5){
    r = x - 2;
  }

  return r;
}
```

