

Exploitations of Uninitialized Uses on macOS Sierra

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Agenda

- ❖ Background & Introduction
- ❖ Vulnerability analysis & Exploitation
- ❖ Conclusion



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- ❖ **Background & Introduction**
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Background

- ❖ Great tools have been developed to eliminate uninitialized use vulnerabilities :
 - ❖ Unisan : prevents kernel data leakage
 - ❖ STACKLEAK : prevents kernel stack data leakage
 - ❖ Split Kernel : same as STACKLEAK

PwnFest 2016

- ❖ Team up with Lokihardt for pwning Safari on macOS Sierra
 - ❖ Remote code execution in Safari by Lokihardt
 - ❖ Kernel code execution in Safari by us



Fixed in macOS Sierra 10.12.3

- ❖ Released January 23, 2017
- ❖ CVE-2017-2357
- ❖ CVE-2017-2358



Mitigations

- ❖ kASLR : kernel Address Space Layout Randomization
- ❖ W^X : Write XOR eXecute
- ❖ SMEP : Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
- ❖ SMAP : Supervisor Mode Access Protection



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- ❖ **Vulnerability analysis & Exploitation**
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CVE-2017-2357

- ❖ The vulnerability lies in IOAudioFamily (≤ 204.4)
- ❖ Source code:
<https://opensource.apple.com/source/IOAudioFamily/IOAudioFamily-204.4/>
- ❖ The vulnerability is caused by partial initialization



Analysis

- ❖ Programs in the user space can register a notification port by calling `IOConnectSetNotificationPort()` on an `IOAudioControlUserClient` object
- ❖ Notification messages will be sent to the port when certain audio events occur afterwards
- ❖ `IOAudioControlUserClient::registerNotificationPort()` will be eventually invoked in the kernel



Analysis

```
IOReturn IOAudioControlUserClient::registerNotificationPort(mach_port_t port, UInt32 type, UInt32 refCon)
{
    ...
    if (notificationMessage == 0) {
        notificationMessage = (IOAudioNotificationMessage *)
            IOMallocAligned(sizeof(IOAudioNotificationMessage), sizeof (IOAudioNotificationMessage *));
        if (!notificationMessage) {
            return kIOReturnNoMemory;
        }
    }
    notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, 0);
    notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_size = sizeof(IOAudioNotificationMessage);
    notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_remote_port = port;
    notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_local_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
    notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_reserved = 0;
    notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_id = 0;
    notificationMessage->ref = refCon;
    ...
}
```

```
typedef struct _IOAudioNotificationMessage
{
    mach_msg_header_t messageHeader;
    UInt32 type;
    UInt32 ref;
    void * sender;
} IOAudioNotificationMessage;
```

notificationMessage is not zeroed out and *type* and *sender* is not initialized



Analysis

- ❖ IOAudioControlUserClient::sendChangeNotification() sends notification messages to userspace programs

```
void IOAudioControlUserClient::sendChangeNotification(UInt32 notificationType)
{
    if (notificationMessage) {
        kern_return_t kr;

        notificationMessage->type = notificationType;
        kr = mach_msg_send_from_kernel(&notificationMessage->messageHeader,
notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_size);
        if ((kr != MACH_MSG_SUCCESS) && (kr != MACH_SEND_TIMED_OUT)) {
            IOLog("IOAudioControlUserClient: sendRangeChangeNotification() failed - msg_send
returned: %d\n", kr);
        }
    }
}
```



Analysis

```
void IOAudioControlUserClient::sendChangeNotification(UInt32 notificationType)
{
    if (notificationMessage) {
        kern_return_t kr;


        notificationMessage->type = notificationType;
        kr = mach_msg_send_from_kernel(&notificationMessage->messageHeader,
notificationMessage->messageHeader.msgh_size);
        if ((kr != MACH_MSG_SUCCESS) && (kr != MACH_SEND_TIMED_OUT)) {
            IOLog("IOAudioControlUserClient: sendRangeChangeNotification() failed - msg_send
returned: %d\n", kr);
        }
    }
}
```

- ❖ *sender* is uninitialized (*notificationMessage* is partial initialized)
- ❖ the kernel sends a message with 8 bytes kernel heap data to the user space



Exploitation

- ❖ *notificationMessage* is allocated via `IOMallocAligned()` which allocates a header structure to store metadata.
- ❖ *notificationMessage* is allocated in `kalloc.80` zone
- ❖ *sender* is at `+0x38`



Exploitation

- ❖ Challenge 1: How to leak critical information such as kASLR slide
- ❖ Challenge 2: How to make the exploitation stable



Exploitation

```
class OSSerialize : public OSObject
{
    ...
private:
    char          * data;
    unsigned int  length;
    unsigned int  capacity;
    unsigned int  capacityIncrement;
    OSArray * tags;
    bool  binary;
    bool  endCollection;
    Editor editor;
    void * editRef;
    ...
}
```

- ❖ The OSSerialize objects are allocated in kalloc.80
- ❖ The member at +0x38 is a function pointer
- ❖ *editor* is set to a kernel function in IORegistryEntryCreateCFProperties()

```
typedef const OSMetaClassBase * (*Editor)(
    void* reference,
    OSSerialize* s,
    OSCollection* container,
    const OSSymbol* name,
    const OSMetaClassBase* value);
```



Exploitation



 function pointers




Exploitation



■ function pointers



Exploitation



 function pointers



Exploitation

- ❖ OSSerialize is allocated and deallocated within a function call (i.e. IORegistryEntryCreateCFProperties())
- ❖ We developed a new technique called “flashing memory”
- ❖ Allocate and deallocate OSSerialize objects very frequently



CVE-2017-2358

- ❖ The vulnerability lies in `AMDRadeonXx000.kext` (*x may vary on different platforms*)
- ❖ The vulnerability is caused by an uninitialized stack variable
- ❖ Accelerator is one of the devices that we can directly access in the WebContent sandbox



Analysis

- ❖ Local variables *v46* and *v47* are not initialized
- ❖ *v46* and *v47* are passed to `LookupResource()`
- ❖ A `vcall` is invoked blindly on *v46* and *v47* then

```
__int64 __fastcall AMDRadeonX4000_AMDAccelShared::
    SurfaceCopy(IOAccelShared2 *this, __int64 a2,
    __int64 a3, __int64 a4)
{
    // local variable declaration
    ...
    IOAccelResource2 *v46; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-88h]@9
    void *v47; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-80h]@9
    ...

    // code
    ...
    IOAccelShared2::lookupResource(this, *(_DWORD *) (a2
        + 8), &v47);
    IOAccelShared2::lookupResource(this, *(_DWORD *) (a2
        + 4), (void ** &v46);
    v6 = -536870206;
    if ( !v47 || !v46 ) ← always false
        goto LABEL_41;
    v12 = (*(__int64 (**)(void))(*(_QWORD *)v47 + 368LL
        ))();
    v13 = (*(__int64 (**)(void))(*(_QWORD *)v46 + 368LL
        ))();
    ...
}
```



Analysis

- ❖ $a2$ is treated as an index into a resource array
- ❖ $*a3$ is set only when $a2$ is valid and the corresponding resource object exists ($_RAX \neq 0$)

```
char __fastcall IOAccelNamespace::lookupId(
    IOAccelNamespace *this, unsigned int a2, void **
    a3)
{
    if ( *((_DWORD *)this + 6) <= a2 )
        return 0;
    _RAX = *(void **)((_QWORD *)this + 2) + 8LL * a2
        ;
    if ( !_RAX )
        return 0;
    *a3 = _RAX;
    __asm { prefetcht0 byte ptr [rax] }
    return 1;
}
```



Analysis

- ❖ $a2$ is user's structure input
- ❖ We can supply an invalid id in the structure input
- ❖ PANIC

```
__int64 __fastcall AMDRadeonX4000_AMDAccelShared::  
    SurfaceCopy(IOAccelShared2 *this, __int64 a2,  
    __int64 a3, __int64 a4)  
{  
    // local variable declaration  
    ...  
    IOAccelResource2 *v46; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-88h]@9  
    void *v47; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-80h]@9  
    ...  
  
    // code  
    ...  
    IOAccelShared2::lookupResource(this, *(_DWORD *) (a2  
        + 8), &v47);  
    IOAccelShared2::lookupResource(this, *(_DWORD *) (a2  
        + 4), (void **)&v46);  
    v6 = -536870206;  
    if ( !v47 || !v46 )  
        goto LABEL_41;  
    v12 = (*(__int64 (**)(void))(*(_QWORD *)v47 + 368LL  
        ))();  
    v13 = (*(__int64 (**)(void))(*(_QWORD *)v46 + 368LL  
        ))();  
    ...  
}
```




Exploitation

- ❖ The uninitialized value on kernel stack is random so we need to control the stack first
- ❖ A function (selector 7333) in the AGPM userclient can be used to taint the stack
- ❖ We are able to copy at most 4096 bytes of controlled, non-zero data onto kernel stack


```
case 7333:  
    kprintf("kAGPMSetPlimit plimit = %llu type = %s\n", *a2->scalarInput, a2->structureInput);  
    v16 = (char *)&v22 - ((a2->structureInputSize + 1 + 15LL) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFOLL);  
    strncpy(v16, (const char *)a2->structureInput, a2->structureInputSize);
```



Exploitation



Exploitation



Exploitation

- ❖ What value should **0xabcdabcdabcdabcd** be?
- ❖ We set **0xabcdabcdabcdabcd** = the address of the object we fake on the heap




Exploitation


- ❖ How can we know the address of our fake objects?
- ❖ Spray several GBs of data on the heap
 - ❖ Heap randomization is weak in the kernel
 - ❖ User-controlled data at fixed, high address (we chose the address 0xffffffff8060010110)




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
Exploitation



Exploitation



Exploitation



Exploitation

- ❖ Save registers
- ❖ Pivot the stack
- ❖ Disable SMEP & SMAP
- ❖ Return to SHELLCODE in the user space
- ❖ Re-enable SMEP & SMAP
- ❖ Call `_thread_exception_return()` to exit



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Conclusion

- ❖ New mitigations make exploitation more challenging but also encourage us to discover new exploit techniques
- ❖ Keep initialization in our mind while coding
- ❖ More effective tools for detecting uninitialized uses are still necessary



Credits

- ❖ Ian Beer
- ❖ qwertyoruiop
- ❖ Lokihardt
- ❖ INT 80 & windknown
- ❖ ...



Thank You For Your Attention
Q&A

