Inducing Authentication Failures to Bypass Credit Card PINs



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Background

- EMV (Europay, Mastercard, VISA): Standard for smartcard payment
- 9+ billion EMV cards in circulation globally
- Data on Integrated Circuit Chips (ICCs)
- EMV standard describes the communication between cards and terminals (payment terminal, ATM)
- Cards either physically inserted (card reader) or communicate contactless using Near Field Communication (NFC) »)








Ecosystem

- Card Issuer (payment network, bank, or a certified organization)
- Payment processing network (e.g., Mastercard, Visa,...)
- Acquirer (e.g., SumUp)
- Merchant
- Cardholder




Steps: Contactless Protocol

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- Application Selection
- Synchronization
- Cardholder Verification
- Authentication/Authorization





- Where can I find the information on the card?
- What information does the issuer need to complete the transaction (amount, currency,...)?
- What Cardholder Verification Methods are supported?
- Is this the legitimate cardholder?
- If CVM limit is exceeded request supported CVM
- Are all requirements met to settle the transaction?
- (In addition, the acquirer and the payment network may use fraud detection systems and block suspicious transaction.)



Security: Contactless Protocol


Authentication / Authorization

- Offline (terminal, card)
 - Uses public key cryptography (signatures)
 - Every card has an RSA key pair and a corresponding certificate of the issuer
 - Terminal has a list of root certificates, checks if certificates provided by the card are valid and verifies parameters (e.g., CVM list)
- Online (issuer/bank)
 - Based on a shared key between issuer (bank) and card
 - Card creates a Message Authentication Code over transaction elements
 - Terminal sends data and MAC to the issuer for authorization






Attacker Model & Attacker's Goal




- Attacker's Goal: Execute arbitrary payments with a victim's card, without (or with downgraded) cardholder verification
- Prerequisite: The attacker has an NFC connection to the victim's card
 - The card is stolen or lost (but not yet revoked)
 - The attacker relays an NFC channel between the victim's card (still in victim's possession) and a terminal of his choice

The Mastercard Protocol



IAC: Issuer Action Code (Denial, Default, Online)



CDA: Combined DDA/Application Cryptogram Generation DDA: Dynamic Data Authentication

Bypassing Cardholder Verification

- The supported cardholder verification methods are announced by the card (to the terminal) in the field CVM List
- The CVM List field is integrity protected by the card's certificate
 - The field is contained in the card's certificate signed by the issuer
- What if offline authentication fails?
 - On page 255 of [1] there is a suspicious pseudo-code fragment:


IF [The CA Public Key Index (Card) is not present in the CA Public Key Database] THEN SET 'CDA failed' in Terminal Verification Results ENDIF


• Furthermore, on page 435 of [1], the specification says:

IF 'CDA failed' in Terminal Verification Results AND On Device Cardholder Verification is not supported THEN Do not request CDA

Bypassing Cardholder Verification

Attack Concept





Inexistent CA PKA Index turns off offline-authentication

Arbitrary modification of CVM List possible





We have tested our findings in real-world payments with 7 different cards issued by three different banks from two countries on different terminal models



We have successfully bypassed PIN verification in 9 transactions using 5 different cards of two issuers



For one issuer, the fraud detection system in the online authorization phase prevented our attack



One terminal type (exclusively used in public transportation) seems not to be vulnerable to our attack

Summary

- EMV is a complex protocol executed between a card/device and a terminal
- Specification and protocol description are (at least for humans) difficult to analyze
- Multiple stakeholders involved, who might influence the outcome of a transaction, i.e., accept or decline transactions
- Results presented are from a specification that allows malicious modifications of critical protocol parameters
- Vulnerability verified in real-world transactions
- Attack trace re-discovered in a Tamarin model of the EMV-protocol
- Security of the countermeasures formally proved in Tamarin