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ARGUS: Context-Based Detection of Stealthy IoT Infiltration Attacks

Phillip Rieger, Marco Chilese, Reham Mohammed, Markus Miettinen,
Hossein Fereidooni, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi





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System
Security
Lab




Contextual Attacks




Benign Scenario

Contextual Attacks




Benign Scenario


Contextual Attacks



Contextual Attacks



Contextual Attacks



Existing Solutions


Network-Intrusion Detection



Cannot detect attacks exploiting control-infrastructure

[Nguyen et al., ICDCS 2019]
[Fan et al., BigDataSE 2020]
[Oconnor et al., WISEC 2019]


Policy-Based Detection



Requires tedious setup by users
Attacker might find gap in policies

[Yahyazadeh et al., SACMAT 2019]
[Celik et al., USENIX ATC 2018]

Contextual Anomaly Detection



1. Require additional information about devices
2. Restricted to known attacks
3. Consider only commands

1. [Fu et al., USENIX Security 2021]
2. [Dai et al., IWCC 2022]
3. [Amraoui et al., CRISIS 2020]

Contributions




- Detects contextual attacks being invisible for network inspection-based systems



- Operates without manual configuration or knowledge of the devices




- Automatic tuning of detection boundary for classifying anomaly scores



- Evaluated on 5 real-world diverse smart-home setups
- Dataset published as benchmark for future work


Argus – Assumptions





- Security device not compromised
- Benign Setup Phase
- IoT devices itself not compromised

Argus – High Level Overview


Technical Challenge: Obtain context for heterogenous device landscape




Argus – Context Modelling



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


Captured
Normal Behavior




Argus – Context Modelling


Technical Challenge: Train system without attack samples




Argus – Context Modelling




Argus – Context Modelling



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
Argus – High Level Overview



Argus – Anomaly-Score Classification

1. Calculate max. score of previous day

$$Max_{d-1} = \max(Scores_{d-1})$$



Argus – Anomaly-Score Classification


1. Calculate max. score of previous day

$$Max_{d-1} = \max(Scores_{d-1})$$

2. Add interval of values from previous day

- Multiply interval with security level β
- Threshold Candidate C_d :

$$C_d = Max_{d-1} + \beta \cdot (Max_{d-1} - Min_{d-1})$$



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
- Multiply interval with security level β
- Threshold Candidate C_d :

$$C_d = Max_{d-1} + \beta \cdot (Max_{d-1} - Min_{d-1})$$

3. Consider history to avoid extreme changes

- Multiply with aging factor α
- Threshold T_d :

$$T_d = \alpha \cdot T_{d-1} + (1 - \alpha) \cdot C_d$$




Evaluation Results

FPR: False Positive Rate
PRC: Precision
REC: Recall

- Evaluation Setup
 - 5 Real World Homes
 - Child and Adult Inhabitants
 - Apartments, Single-Room Apartment, Room in shared Flat
- Evaluated Attacks Include:
 - Door Open during Absence
 - Lights-On during Absence
 - Movement during Absence
 - Lights-On During Night
- 7 Days of Training Data Sufficient


Dataset	FPR	PRC	REC	F1-Score
Home 1	0.03%	99.22%	100.00%	99.64%
Home 2	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Home 3	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Home 4	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Home 5	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%



Conclusion



- IoT Devices are vulnerable to attacks via insecure control devices
- Network-Based Detection mechanisms fail detecting such attacks as network traffic is indistinguishable
- Existing contextual defenses requires manual setup or information about devices



- ARGUS monitors IoT device context to detect attacks exploiting insecure control plane
- Models normal behavior using Deep Auto-Encoder to calculate anomaly score
- Calculates dynamic threshold to classify anomaly-score



- No knowledge on devices or attacks necessary
- Works without manual setup
- 7 days of training data achieved F1-Score $\geq 99.64\%$ on 5 real-world homes