

# Internet Service Providers' and Individuals' Attitudes, Barriers, and Incentives to Secure IoT

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USENIX 2023

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# THE AUTHORS



# Introduction and Background

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The adoption of *Internet of Things* devices is growing rapidly

- IoT provides many benefits to consumers and businesses

However...

- Unsecured IoT devices pose risks to individuals and networks
- Securing IoT is challenging
- Many stakeholders have a role to play in securing IoT: manufacturers, government, ISPs, businesses, researchers, and individuals
- Many of these stakeholders lack expertise, knowledge, resource, or incentive

This work focuses on two stakeholders, **ISPs** and **individuals** — in **Japan**

We look at **attitudes**, **barriers**, and **incentives** of these stakeholders

ISPs can and do make a difference, especially in identifying, notifying, and quarantining the infected customer<sup>1</sup>

- Walled gardens (where allowed) can be used to quarantine and notify customers, but highly disruptive

ISPs can also have a role *before* compromise:

- ISPs can scan for vulnerable IoT devices and isolate them from the Internet before they are compromised<sup>2</sup>
- Government agencies can scan for vulnerable or infected IoT devices and ask the ISPs to notify the owner of these devices to take actions to remediate

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<sup>1</sup>Asghari, Eeten, and Bauer, “Economics of fighting botnets: Lessons from a decade of mitigation”.

<sup>2</sup>Dietz et al., “IoT-botnet detection and isolation by access routers”.

### NOTICE: National Operation Towards IoT Clean Environment

- An ongoing nationwide project to identify and remediate vulnerable and infected IoT devices in Japan
- The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) identifies vulnerable or compromised IoT devices
- Participating ISPs are informed and assume the responsibility of identifying and notifying their customers who own the devices

## The study

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We look at two key stakeholders in the IoT ecosystem: **ISPs** and **individuals**.

Three research questions:

**Q1** *What are ISPs' and individuals' attitudes towards the security and privacy of IoT?*


(Attitudes: concerns, perceptions, commitment, views of other stakeholders)

**Q2** *What are the barriers that prevent ISPs and individuals to keep IoT secure?*

**Q3** *What are the incentives to encourage ISPs and individuals to keep IoT secure?*



# METHODOLOGY: INTERVIEWS, SURVEYS, AND WORKSHOPS



Iterative participatory action research

- ISP Questionnaire
- 1st ISP Workshop
- Individuals interviews
- Individuals survey
- 2nd ISP Workshop


# Results

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
# ISPs ATTITUDES

- Perceived responsibility and current level of commitment:

A. Perceived responsibility



B. Current level of commitment



- ISPs believe they are well-placed to do notification and detection
- Most concerned about service disruptions and service continuity, prevention or recovery is secondary

# ISP VIEWS ON IMPROVING IOT SECURITY

- **Internal barriers**
  - Staffing, particularly at smaller ISPs
  - Executive buy-in, particularly at large ISPs
- **External barriers**
  - Individuals are careless & unable to secure devices
  - IoT Device makers build insecure devices
- **Notification barriers**
  - Tech: dynamic IP addresses
  - Social: not up-to-date contact details; account holder is not device owner
- **Solutions**
  - Better tech to detect and remediate
  - Device makers secure IoT
  - Regulatory changes to allow ISPs to restrict more traffic
  - Better awareness: get notified users to actually fix their devices

# INDIVIDUAL VIEWS TO IMPROVE IOT SECURITY

- Mostly not concerned about IoT security
- Uncertain about the likelihood and impact of compromise
- Very average security behaviours
- **Remediating compromised IoT**
  - Don't know what to do/where to start (74%)
  - Easier to replace (28%), fixing is not worth the time/stress (28%)
  - 26% had tried to fix things; of these, only 21% had no problems doing so
- **How to improve the situation**
  - Experience negative consequence of IoT attacks themselves or hear about them from friends
  - No other party is particularly seen as particularly responsible
- **Views on ISP initiatives**
  - 55% support notification; 54% notify & block suspicious traffic
  - 58–73% of participants are willing to pay for additional services to secure the home IoT

## MACRO SOCIO-TECHNICAL CHALLENGES

- Keeping IoT secure is not a priority for ISPs and individuals
- Many stakeholders that need to work together: NOTICE project encouraged collaboration
- An effective government is at the heart of solutions
  - Many of the barriers and incentives are external to ISPs and individuals
  - Encourage collaboration
  - Change the law to allow ISPs to lawfully monitor and block suspicious IoT traffic
  - Provide subsidy/rewards/recognition to ISPs
  - Increase the visibility of regulation around IoT
- Empower those that can make a difference

Thanks!

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