

Is Your Wallet Snitching On You?

An Analysis on the Privacy Implications of Web3

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Fiona Willi


Shweta Shinde

ETH zürich

What is Web3?


Web 2.0

- Data is **centralized** across a small group of companies



Web 3.0

- Data is **decentralized** through blockchain technology




¹ dappradar.com

² futuremarketinsights.com

- **+1,000** Decentralized Applications (DApps)¹
- Market capitalization estimated at **US \$3 billion**²


Interacting with Web3



Interacting with Web3



User



Web3 ~~Web2~~-Enabled Browser



MetaMask
+ 10 million Users

Interacting with Web3




User

Connect wallet




Web3 ~~Web2~~-Enabled Browser



Interacting with Web3



User



Web3 ~~Web2~~-Enabled Browser


DApp can now access user specific information (e.g., wallet address)

0xEf7d...44D5

Interacting with Web3




User



Web3 ~~Web2~~-Enabled Browser

Retrieve blockchain data
(e.g., wallet balance)

0.00123 ETH



Blockchain
Client

What about Privacy?

Web3 introduces sensible user information:

- Wallet address
- Transactions
- Balance
- ...

Web3 technology is based on Web2 technology


- DApps may include 3rd party scripts
- Traffic is routed via TCP/IP

Is the privacy of Web3 users at risk?

Contributions

- First large-scale study on wallet address leakage across DApps and wallet extensions
- First measurement study on the prevalence of web3-based browser fingerprinting
- Analysis on the efficacy of popular blocklists against web3-based online tracking

Threat Model



Problem 1: Wallet Address Leakage

- Your wallet address is **unique**
- Wallet address accessible via MetaMask object

3rd party scripts can read wallet address via JavaScript* and send it to their backend



User




3rd party scripts have access to the MetaMask object via the DOM


0xEf7d...44D5



195.51.13.15



alice@aol.com



3rd Party Backend

Wallet address can be linked to other personal information (e.g., IP address, email, etc.)

*Assuming DApp is connected with user's wallet

Problem 2: Web3-Based Browser Fingerprinting

- Browser fingerprinting is a well-known problem on the web
- Web3 further **augments** this problem




User



MetaMask injects a JavaScript object into every website a user visits (i.e., `window.ethereum`)


- 3rd parties can read this JavaScript object to:
- Check which cryptocurrency user owns
 - Check which wallet user has installed
 - Augment user's browser fingerprint

Framework Overview



<https://github.com/christofortorres/Web3-Privacy>

Measuring Wallet Address Leakage




- Found **211** DApps leaking the user's wallet address to at least one 3rd party
- Analyzed privacy policy of top 3rd parties: **95%** collect your IP address

```
https://www.google-analytics.com/collect?v=1&_v=j99&a=1044933369&t=event&ni=0&_s=1&d1=https%3A%2F%2Fdegens.farm%2Fwallet&_ul=en-us&de=UTF-8&dt=Degen%27%24%20Farm%3A%20Wallet&sd=30-bit&sr=1512x982&vp=1512x749&je=0&ec=WalletConnected&ea=0x7e4abd63a7c8314cc28d388303472353d884f292&el=labelForWalletConnect&ev=7.20999590401511e%2B47&_u=ADAAEABAAAAACAAI~&jid=&gid=&ci_d=437541385.1675387202&tid=UA-201259489-1&_gid=196110690.1675387203&gtm=2wg2105PC69BZ&z=1330733511
```

Wallet address leaked via HTTP GET request to [google-analytics.com](https://www.google-analytics.com) on the degens.farm DApp

Measuring Leakage Across Wallet Extensions




- **None** of the analyzed wallet extensions **leak your password** or **browser history**
- **13** extensions **leak your wallet address** to third-parties (e.g., blockchain providers, advertisers)

Measuring Web3-Based Browser Fingerprinting



User

Crawled Top 100K
Tranco websites



Intercepted JavaScript calls to popular
wallet APIs (e.g., window.ethereum)

```
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded",  
(function() {  
  var e = (0, t.getSettings)(),  
  n = void 0 !== window.ethereum,  
  o = void 0 !== window.BinanceChain,  
  a = void 0 !== window.solana;  
  ...  
  var u = new XMLHttpRequest;  
  u.open("post", "/x-api", !0), ...,  
  u.send(JSON.stringify({  
    ...  
    requestData: {  
      model: {  
        ...  
        key: "ext_detection",  
        data: {  
          ethereum: n,  
          BinanceChain: o,  
          solana: a  
        }  
      }  
    }  
  }  
}))  
}))
```

<https://static-1v1t.xhcdn.com/xh-shared/js/v1d487c898d.ext-detect>

- Found **878** scripts across **1,099** websites leveraging wallet information to perform browser fingerprinting
- Most websites performing Web3-based browser fingerprinting are related to **Pornography & Sexuality**




Do Blocklists Improve Your Privacy?



User



- Analyzed efficacy of **5 popular Ad blockers**:
 - **Whotracks.me** provides **best protection** (43%)
 - **Disconnect** provides **weakest protection** (12%)
- Installing **multiple Ad blockers** improves privacy
 - **Combination of all blocks** 56% of third-parties



Conclusion

- **Web3 wallet extensions pose a serious threat** to user's privacy
 - Found **evidence of popular websites** performing web3-based browser fingerprinting
 - **34%** of connected **DApps leak the user's wallet address** to third-parties
 - **44%** of the third-parties **are not blocked** by popular Ad blockers
- **New solutions** need to be developed **to preserve user's privacy**

Questions?



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<https://github.com/christoftorres/Web3-Privacy>