



UNIVERSITÄT ZU LÜBECK
INSTITUTE FOR IT SECURITY

Cipherfix: Mitigating Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks in Software

Jan Wichelmann & Anna Pätschke, Luca Wilke, and Thomas Eisenbarth


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32nd Usenix Security Symposium







How can we protect our code against ciphertext side-channels?



Without TEE




- Run code in the cloud




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Confidential Cloud Computing




- Run code in the cloud
- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) encrypts code and data

Confidential Cloud Computing




- Run code in the cloud
- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) encrypts code and data
- Constant-time code protects against timing side-channels

Confidential Cloud Computing




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Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation

Ciphertext Side-Channel




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- Memory encryption should protect secret b

Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation
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- *Deterministic memory encryption*

Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation
- Memory encryption should protect secret b
- *Deterministic* memory encryption \Rightarrow ciphertext change leaks b

Enforcing Ciphertext Changes




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Enforcing Ciphertext Changes




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Enforcing Ciphertext Changes




- Add random mask on every write
- Ciphertext always changes \Rightarrow no leakage


From Vulnerable to Hardened Binary



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

From Vulnerable to Hardened Binary





		public				secret				
plaintext	11	22	33	44	11	22	33	44		

mask	00	00	00	00	48	d3	f3	0d
data	11	22	33	44	59	f1	c0	49


- Back data with a *mask buffer*




- Back data with a *mask buffer*
- Store random mask in mask buffer



- Back data with a *mask buffer*
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- Mask is zero for public data



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- Store secrecy information in separate *secrecy buffer*



- Store secrecy information in separate *secrecy buffer*
- All 1 for secret data, all 0 for public data

- `rdrand`: Secure

- `rdrand`: Secure and slow

- **rdrand**: Secure and slow
- **XS+**: Well-known **XorShift128+** RNG

Mask Generation


- `rdrand`: Secure and slow
- `XS+`: Well-known `XorShift128+` RNG
- `AES`: Custom RNG based on one AES round

Mask Generation


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	Performance	Security
rdrand		
XS128+		
AES		


Summary





Summary



Summary



Summary



<https://github.com/UzL-ITS/cipherfix>



@JanWichelmann
@paetscan




Runtime Performance Overhead

	AES	XS128+	rdrand
Cipherfix-Fast	2.4x	2.7x	16.8x
Cipherfix-Base	3.9x	4.0x	17.3x
Cipherfix-Enhanced	5.1x	5.3x	17.5x

- Average performance overhead factor of multiple primitives
- Slowdown is restricted to few isolated code sections

Cipherfix-Enhanced



- Store secrecy information in separate *secrecy buffer*
- All 1 for secret data, all 0 for public data
- Enforce minimum size of memory writes