

# **Hard Problems We Handle in Incidents**

*...but aren't often recognized*

**John Allspaw**  
Adaptive Capacity Labs



POLICE TELEPHONE

FREE  
FOR USE OF  
PUBLIC


ADVICE & ASSISTANCE  
OBTAINABLE IMMEDIATELY

OFFICER & CARS  
RESPOND TO ALL CALLS

PULL TO OPEN

**incidents are  
*bigger on the inside***





Making Intelligent Systems Team Players:  
Case Studies and Design Issues

NASA Technical Memorandum 104738 (1991)

**diagnostic  
activities**

**therapeutic  
activities**

**recruiting  
activities**

**status/reporting  
activities**



diagnostic  
activities

## Observations & Signals

*What* is happening?

*How* is it happening?

*How* did it get like this?

*What* will it do next?

What **tools**...

- could I use?
- are others already using?

What **observations**...

- should I share with others?
- do I need to explain? how much detail?

How much **attention** should I pay...

- to what *I'm* doing and seeing?
- to what *others* are doing and seeing?

What *can* we do?

What *are we able* to do?

- ...to lessen the impact, or prevent it from getting worse?
- ...to halt/revert systems, sacrificing potential data?
- ...to resolve the issue entirely?

therapeutic  
activities



- What options can *I* see?
- What options are **others** proposing?

What **expertise** does the group have?

What **expertise** does the group **need**?

**recruiting  
activities**

Who do I know who has that **expertise/authority**?

How can they be called on for help?

What do they need to know when they arrive?

What **authority** does the group have?

What **authority** does the group **need**?



Which individuals or groups need to be informed about the ***current status of the response?***



- How often do they need to be updated?
- What level of detail do they need?
- Who will do this?

Which individuals or groups need to be informed about ***potential downstream impacts or effects?***




# Costs of Coordination

Controlling the Costs of  
Coordination in Large-scale  
Distributed Software Systems

Dr. Laura Maguire

[bit.ly/MaguirePhD](https://bit.ly/MaguirePhD)







**On-Call  
Eng**



**DBA**



**SRE**




**Customer  
Service**



**Security  
Eng**




**Application  
Eng**



**Application  
Eng**



**Eng  
Manager**



**Network  
Eng**




**Time**



effort needed to bring them "up to speed"


← **TRADE-OFF SPACE** →

... takes attention away from handling the incident




Should they stay focused on the incident in order to maximize their chances of quick diagnosis and repair....


...or devote some of their effort to bringing others up to speed so that they can help in that work?



# “Divide and conquer” also has costs







## Benefit:

Lisa can do other things while Phil works on that

## Cost:

- have to identify the task to delegate
- have to select someone to do it
- have to specify what is to be done
- pay attention later to the report back from person

It only makes sense to assign tasks that are:

- well bounded
- can be accomplished by an individual, and
- for which a suitable person is both available and *not already working on a higher priority task.*

There is yet another catch for this gamble:

New information about the event might reveal that doing a specific task could be unnecessary...or even hazardous (!)

This imposes additional workload on all the parties.

# Don't take my word for it

## The Secret Lives of SREs - Controlling the Costs of Coordination across Remote Teams

Monday, December 07, 2020 - 10:15 am-11:00 am  
Laura Maguire, PhD







# Sacrifice Decisions

“During disturbances...achieving important ("high level") goals may require abandoning less important ("low level") ones.

Sometimes the sacrifice requires incurring damage, even severe damage, in order to prevent an even greater catastrophe.”

*(Woods, D. D. (2017) STELLA: Report from the SNAFUcatchers Workshop on Coping With Complexity)*

## **examples:**

- Forcing a network partition to allow recovery
- Killing slow-running database queries until they can be fixed in code
- Reducing (or even eliminating) cross-datacenter encryption mechanisms temporarily to relieve data replication lag

# Sacrifice Decisions

**CNN BUSINESS** Markets Tech Media Success Video

Investing Guide

## Trading resumes on NYSE after nearly 4-hour outage

by Patrick Gillespie, Matt Egan and Heather Long @CNMoneyInvest


July 8, 2015: 7:23 PM ET

**NOW PLAYING**  
NYSE resumes trading  
CNNMoney

**BREAKING NEWS**  
NYSE RESUMES TRADING 3.5 HOURS AFTER HALT

3:14 PM ET

00:36 / 02:00



# Sacrifice Decisions

“My first concern was do no harm during the day,” Farley said.

“Those stocks continue to trade elsewhere. Get the problem fixed. And get it back up and running for the close. We chose the least disruptive option for customers.”

The New York Times

Opinion  
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

## The Bumbling, Irrelevant New York Stock Exchange

By William D. Cohan  
July 9, 2015

[f](#) [@](#) [t](#) [✉](#) [📺](#) [↪](#) [🔖](#)

The good news, if there is any, for the New York Stock Exchange and its parent company, Intercontinental Exchange, is that the extraordinary nearly four-hour trading halt on Wednesday







# Parallel Incidents Dilemma

1. If two incident responses **are** related, combining efforts & observations could be *very* helpful and productive.
2. If two incident responses are **not** related, investigating if they were could be seen as a waste of time.

*wait...are these related?*



# Parallel Incidents Dilemma



- How can you discover if *another* incident response is happening at the same time yours is?
- If you do discover one, how could you tell if time/effort spent determining if they are related is warranted?



10:44:24 **Steve** TOPIC :bunch of hosts flapping

10:44:38 **Kevin** i checked my jobs; this is not the same outage like last Thursday

10:44:49 **Lisa** all over the console on memcached21: nf\_conntrack: table full, dropping packet




10:45:08 **Steve** oh wow

10:45:18 **Lisa** did anyone push anything iptables related?


10:45:20 **Steve** is that recent though?

10:45:23 **Tim** Lisa: I did



Steve




Kevin




Lisa



Tim








+01:20:54


“Hey Steve, can you shed some light on this error?”



+01:24:42  
“Ah, yeah there was a PR merged this morning...”



+02:20:26  
“just joining so this might be off, but there’s another incident...”



+03:16:13  
“hey all...this is what’s happening...”






We are way better at this stuff than we think we are

It's also difficult for us to see what makes us good at it

Expertise is more  
invisible than we realize.



“We can know more than we can tell.”



Having vocabulary for these phenomena is important.

When we've got words for them, we should use those in our stories.

**Thanks.**